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The New Context
The context for EU policy towards the Western Balkans has changed to the point that the time is now ripe for a new stage in the pre-accession process for the region. Positive momentum needs to be visibly reinforced, and there are possibilities to do so at the EU and regional level. Further intentions to apply for membership are being announced by Montenegro before the end of 2008, and by Serbia, whose new government also intends to apply by the end of the year. These two countries will presumably join Macedonia at some stage, as countries with candidate status but without initially a launch of accession negotiations.
For its part the EU continues to re-affirm the full membership vocation of the entire region. At the same time the hiatus over the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty casts a shadow over these prospects, and notably leads President Sarkozy to say bluntly that there will be no further enlargement without the Lisbon Treaty. If Lisbon's ratification is completed in 2009, the signing of a Treaty of Accession with Croatia could take place in 2010, with effective accession maybe in 2011. But beyond that there are no clear scenarios for who might be next and when.
Meanwhile the August war between Russia and Georgia, raising questions over how Russia might next extend its coercive methods right up alongside the Balkans (in Moldova or Ukraine), adds to Russia's current behaviour towards Serbia and Kosovo as a reason for the EU to strengthen its Balkan policies.
Overall this new context poses two issues of strategy for the EU and Western Balkan states.
The first is how the EU can sustain the positive momentum of developments in the region, even while the EU's enlargement process seems likely to remain at best on 'slow', or at worst on 'stop', for some time. Could the EU go further than the current SAA process with the integration of Western Balkan states into the functioning of EU policies before membership?
The second related question is whether the current mix of bilateralism versus regional multilaterism is quite right or not. The SAA process is essentially bilateral, with so far only some rather fragmentary elements of regional multilateralism.
The Stabilisation and Association Agreements
Since the adequacy of the SAA process is at the heart of both these questions, let us first assess the facts. The SAAs are the formal framework of contractual relations between the EU and the individual states of the Western Balkans. They follow the same format, and in many articles have identical wording. The agreements are structured along the same lines as the long list of 'chapters' negotiated with accession candidates. The difference is that for accession candidates all chapters have to be brought to a state of legal compliance with the EU acquis, and proof of implementation; whereas the SAAs are more of a warming-up exercise, inviting the partner state to move gradually into compliance and otherwise to 'cooperate' in various domains. The table of contents of a specimen SAA (with Croatia) is presented in Annex A, together with brief comments on the content.
Of the ten Titles, the first three on democratic principles, political dialogue and regional cooperation are in the nature of declarations of intent, without precise operational or legally binding content. However the reference to democratic principles and human rights in Article 2 states that they: "constitute essential elements of this Agreement", which is Euro-code language for marking it out as the political condition for proceeding with the whole integration process.
Title IV contains the main 'red meat', setting out the terms of a free trade agreement to be fulfilled within six years. Quantitative restrictions and some customs duties are abolished immediately, while other provisions are phased in over 3 to 6 years. Anti-dumping provisions and safeguard clauses remain in place.
Title V goes through the other three economic 'freedoms' of movement: for services, capital, and labour. However the content is far from reaching conditions of 'freedom'. Services are to be liberalised progressively, but only starting after four years and in ways that are not specified. Legally employed workers shall not be discriminated against, but this certainly does not amount to freedom of movement. Some capital controls remain possible, although direct investment is free.
Title VI on the approximation of laws and competition rules has considerable content under the broad heading of gradual approximation on the EU's internal market acquis. Compliance with EU acquis is obligatory for competition rules, state aids, intellectual property rights and public contracts, either immediately or within 3 years. This amounts to a significant deepening of the free trade area.
Title VII on justice and home affairs mainly involves 'cooperation', which means no binding or operationally defined content. The main 'red meat' here is the obligation to re-admit illegal migrants.
Title VIII is called 'Cooperation policies', and is a very long list of mostly vague declarations, including some intentions to gradually adopt the EU acquis in areas such as agricultural standards. Issues of macroeconomic policy are dealt with in very cursory terms.
Title IX announces the availability of EU financial assistance, but amounts are not specified here.
Finally, Title X provides for the institutional structure, notably the Stabilisation and Association Council.
Overall the operational and legally binding content of the SAAs consists mainly of a fairly deep free trade area, while the remaining extensive (or almost encyclopaedic) landscape of issues amounts to little more than sketching the agenda that will later have to take real shape in the process of accession negotiations. For countries like Croatia that are already well advanced in the accession negotiations, the passage from SAA to membership is an easy fit. For others with more remote prospects for the opening of negotiations, however, the question is how the SAA process might be boosted in order to enhance the momentum of Europeanisation.
Trade policies
Although the free trade element is the most substantial part of the SAA, a re-think is needed. • The first option is the actual policy course, according to which all Western Balkan states have made free trade agreements with the EU as part of their Stabilisation and Association Agreements. All have also joined in a renewed CEFTA system for multilateral free trade between each other, and plan to negotiate rules of origin agreements with the EU using the standard Pan-Euro-Med model regulation for this purpose. These rules of origin agreement permit 'diagonal cumulation' of value added between two or more stages of production in different countries sharing free trade agreements with each other and the EU, thus helping achieve the required minimum total value added in the free trade partner states to qualify for duty free import into the EU. Each stage of cumulation of value added between free trade partner states has to be supported by proof, with documentation certified by accredited agencies. This is burdensome for both enterprises and customs administrations, and a temptation for corruption.
• The second option would be for all the Western Balkans to enter into the customs union (of the EU, Turkey and Andorra), requiring that the Western Balkans adopt the EU's common external tariff with third countries, in addition to complying with various standards for customs procedures. The advantage of the customs union over the first option is that there is no need any longer for the complicated rules of origin, with the especially complicated procedures for diagonal cumulation. In the customs union goods circulate freely, since any good entering from a third country will have borne the common external tariff. The benefit from scrapping the rules of origin procedures for trade between the EU and the Western Balkans would be especially important for the region given that it is a cluster of small states virtually surrounded by EU, and where complex structures of 'producer-driven supply chains' across these countries should develop.
A further argument in favour of the customs union option follows on from the fact that all the Western Balkans would be doing is what is necessary in any case for accession, with the adoption of the common external tariff and administrative aspects of customs procedures. By contrast the first option requires an important investment in rules of origin procedures, only for these to be scrapped later as accession approaches.
The development of intra-industry trade and producer-driven supply chains places a premium on clarity, simplicity and reliability of an open-trading regime, suitable for complex 'just in time' logistics. The business sector needs clear information, that can be reduced to credible branding, where country 'x' can be regarded 'as if' in the EU internal market without any doubt or complicated qualification. The customs union provides this, whereas free trade with diagonal cumulation of value added does not. The customs union formula is an advantage not just for trade, but also for favouring foreign direct investment, which in turn is a major mechanism for stimulating intra-industry trade.
With these major arguments so clearly in favour of the customs union option for the Western Balkans it seems odd that the European Commission does not favour it. One argument heard is that the customs union with Turkey has led to complications and tensions. More precisely Turkey has not always wanted to apply the EU's common external tariff, which is a basic requirement of customs union.
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This is because Turkey is a major economy at the edge of the EU, with important trading and political relationships with Russia, the Middle East and Central Asia. However these arguments are not relevant for the Western Balkans, which are surrounded by the EU and much more dependent on it.
The superiority of the customs union option is advocated in the key messages of the cited World Bank study, which on this point concludes:
Benefits from EU and regional integration would be maximized by creating a 'shadow customs union' with the EU for industrial products. Currently CEFTA countries' tariffs are higher and more dispersed than those of the EU, providing scope for trade diversion. It is suggested that all CEFTA countries (who are simultaneously adopting CEFTA and the trade components of their Stabilisation and Association Agreements) adopt EU MFN tariffs for industrial products. This would amount to creating a virtual customs union encompassing the Western Balkans and the EU… 5 A final argument favouring this course of action concerns the problem of corruption of border controls and customs procedures. These are major problems in all of south-east Europe, as is well known. However the easing of customs procedures and scrapping rules of origin requirements for trade within the enlarged customs union 6 would be a useful step in cutting the opportunities for border corruption.
The dangers of floods of imports flowing illegally into the EU market from third countries via this enlargement of the customs union is particularly reduced, due to the fact that the Western Balkans, after Croatian accession, will be close to becoming an enclave within the EU. There will only be a few ports in Montenegro and Albania to control, and for this the EU could easily deploy some customs personnel to monitor and strengthen the customs services there.
Responsibility for organising this re-calibration of policy should fall not only on the European Commission, but also the Western Balkan states themselves, and here the newly founded Regional Cooperation Council could play a key role. This is a quintessential task for the Council to take up, since it calls for a regional logic and consistency.
Monetary policies
Inclusion into the euro area is one of the most potent mechanisms and symbols of European integration. The EU's official doctrine is that only member states can accede to the euro area, and even after becoming a full member state there are further demanding conditions for acceptance into the euro area. These are the Maastricht criteria, namely that:
• The inflation rate has to be not higher than 1.5% above the average of the three best performing euro states • The budget deficit should not exceed 3% of GDP • The public debt should not exceed 60% of GDP, and • The exchange rate should have remained stable within the exchange rate mechanism band of +/-2.5 % for two years • The long-term interest rate should not exceed that of the three best inflation performing states by more than 2%.
These conditions are being applied with great severity, as exemplified by the rejection of Lithuania's entry into the eurozone in 2007, on the grounds that its inflation rate was 2.7%, 6 Leaving of course the EU's standard rules of origin to be applied by the customs union states for imports from various partner states of the EU in free trade or preferential regimes.
insignificantly higher than the 2.6% of the three reference countries. The EU institutions have taken a strongly negative view towards the unilateral adoption of the euro by non-member states as a matter of doctrine. However as an economic proposition there can be serious arguments in favour of unilateral euroisation (as also for dollarisation). The arguments are most strongly positive for economies that are very small, open and dependent on the EU (or US), and whose own monetary and financial governance may be weak, and poorly placed to resist short-term political pressures for populist policies. If the country's own institutions are fragile and lack long-term credibility the economy will have to bear a risk premium on its interest rates, which will have a negative impact on investment and growth. If on the other hand the economy has adopted the euro (or dollar) as its currency, the temptation to indulge in unsustainable budgetary policies will be greatly dampened, since there will be no possibility to inflate away the burden of the public debt. Further, if the economy is to become totally integrated into the EU's market there are synergetic reasons to add the single currency to the single market: the single currency eliminates exchange transaction costs, improves the transparency of cost accounting, and clinches the credibility of perceptions of the business community that the economy is effectively part of the EU. by the institutions seem to be fourfold. First it would deprive the economy of the exchange rate adjustment instrument; but this argument is of little force for small economies that are already largely euro-ised informally. Second it would perhaps tarnish the euro's credibility, but after ten years of the euro this argument now lacks plausibility, especially since the non-member states are not represented on the board of the European Central Bank. Third, as a political morality story, newly acceding states should go through the same Maastricht tests as the founding fathers of the euro, but this condition could still apply (see below). Fourth, EU finance ministers do not want to be distracted by matters that for them are marginal, which is not a respectable argument.
Since the weight of these negative arguments is thin to say the least, the EU would be justified in recalibrating its position as follows:
• With the whole of the region now clearly set on joining the EU market there are synergetic advantages to joining the single currency as well • Western Balkan states should have the option to adopt the euro unilaterally if they so wish.
The EU's concern not to undermine the governance of the European Central Bank can be met by a rule that when an already euroised state accedes as a full member state it shall not be admitted to the board of the European Central Bank until and unless it has respected the Maastricht criteria. 
Structural funds
In this section data are presented for the hypothesis that the Western Balkans would be treated as member states for the purpose of allocating grant aid from the EU. With this exception the hypothesis retained here is that the Western Balkan states could be offered a path for progressive increases in structural aid from the EU towards the levels granted to the new member states from the Structural Funds. The conditions to be respected for moving along this path would first require agreement by the region to join the customs union of the EU and Turkey. This would be consistent with the logic of the original decision under the Delors Commission to accompany completion of the internal market with expansion of the structural funds to aid adjustment processes. Secondly, there would have to be credible programmes for improving judicial systems and reducing corruption. As the current Bulgarian example has shown, the use of EU funds provides mechanisms for auditing financial practices in public and private sectors, and for intervening forcefully at the political level when abuses are observed. Further, the Bulgarian and Romanian experiences underline the importance of using conditional EU funding before accession to secure anti-corruption and judicial reforms before accession, given that the leverage of this conditionality is so much more effective before accession.
Movement of people
The European Council agreed in June 2008 to advance to a new stage towards the freedom of movement of people between the Western Balkans and the EU, using the expression 'visa liberalisation' (meaning scrapping visas). The intention now is for the Commission to prepare roadmaps for the conditions for this to be achieved.
There has already been a set of 'visa facilitation' agreements with Western Balkan states, but these have been criticised as remaining heavily restrictive and burdensome. The Regional Cooperation Council should work on the elimination of all remaining intra-Western Balkan visa restrictions.
The Bulgarian and Romanian accessions, which were preceded by the scrapping of visas with the EU, have intensified the tensions over remaining restrictions for the Western Balkans, since the enlargement meant new visa restrictions between, for example, Macedonia and Bulgaria. As a result there has been a strong rise in evasive practices, like the acquisition of Bulgarian citizenship by many Macedonians, as well as the continuing process of Moldovans acquiring Romanian citizenship.
Kosovo is presumably now proceeding to issue its own passports, which should be accepted by all EU states, not just those which have recognised its independence (which would be following the Taiwan model for countries that have not been recognised).
The key question for the Commission now, and of course for EU member states in the Council, is how they specify the conditions and timelines for scrapping visas. Presumably there will be an agenda concerning the security quality of passports and systems of cooperation with security services, including the Schengen information system for 'black-listed' persons. There will surely be arguments about how far the Western Balkan states should go in improving the general state of law enforcement and reduction of criminality as preconditions, but here a counter-argument needs to be taken into account, namely that visa restrictions that are difficult to enforce become a source of criminality and illegal trafficking. This model of complete regional-multilateral integration with the EU invites reflection on the optimal balance to be followed, as the Western Balkan integration process advances, between the bilateralism of the SAA and accession negotiations, and this regional multilateralism for virtual membership on account of specific policies. While both models are surely going to persist in complementary roles in the pre-accession period, this energy policy development may be initiating a model that deserves wider application. 
Energy and transport communities

Box 1. Summary features of the Energy Community Treaty
The Serbia-Kosovo recognition problem
The point is often made that Serbia cannot accede to the EU without recognising Kosovo's independence, which would contradict Serbia's present constitution. And even the new government refuses to countenance recognition. In addition Kosovo could not accede without being recognised by all member states and thence by the EU itself. Beyond legalisms there is also the need for Belgrade and Pristina to find a way of cooperating over their respective minorities, not only the Serbs in Kosovo, but also the ethnic Albanians in Southern Serbia. So there is a situation still to be tidied up legally and functionally.
For the time being politicians can wait for emotions to calm down, with no need for the EU to push Belgrade on the issue of recognising Kosovo. In due course realities may become increasingly accepted, and the issue of recognition may descend to the level of finding some accommodating form of words that is acceptable to all sides.
As an example of legal-political ingenuity of the kind needed here, a former UN special representative for Kosovo advanced the 'German model' that prevailed before re-unification: The Federal Republic's constitution could only embrace the whole of the post-war German territory, yet both the FRG and the DDR were at the same time member states of the United Nations. Another example of diplomatic accommodation of the irreconcilable was seen with the Liechtenstein imbroglio of 2005. 11 There is time for the resolution of the SerbiaKosovo imbroglio, before the accession of either or both. In the meantime there are practical matters to be properly ordered. One example now is the export of petroleum products from Serbia duty free into Northern Kosovo, which results in new flows of traffic just to fill up with duty free petrol, and move illegally across corruptly administered frontiers. 
Recalibrating conditionalities
For some time now independent analysts have been pointing out confusions in the EU's application of political conditionalities in the Western Balkans. For example Othon Anastasakis argues:
The Western Balkan region reveals special trends in the EU's handling of the strategy of political conditionality, and some creeping contradictions and dangers are beginning to show the limits of conditionality. More specifically the EU:
(a) is adding further, yet necessary, political conditions and criteria to weaker or more reluctant partners, and emphasises the journey rather than the outcome of accession, affecting the credibility of the instrument, (c) it pursues, in some cases, a rigorous assessment of compliance and, in other cases, a more adaptable and pragmatic assessment for the sake of preserving peace and avoiding insecurity risks, affecting the consistency of the process.
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Similar critiques are made by Gergana Noutcheva, who shows that EU policy in the Western Balkans has often been driven more by security concerns than its internal norms and rules of governance, and thus created confusion and compliance problems for its alleged conditionalities.
14 In response to these critiques the following clarification of EU conditionality policy is proposed, as part of the scheme already set out above for four main blocks of policy -trade, the euro, visas and the structural funds. For these four blocks of policy the emphasis is on functional conditionality.
For the extension of the EU-Turkey customs union to the Western Balkans the basic functional condition should be the application of the common external tariff (and various technical customs procedures).
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For agreeing to visa-free travel the conditions should again be strictly functional, and concern the security quality of passports and cooperation arrangements such as with the Schengen Information System.
For increased volumes of structural aid the conditions should again be functional, linked to agreement on joining the customs union of the EU and Turkey, and the adequacy of financial control and anti-corruption policies.
As for euroisation before accession, this would be essentially a unilateral move freely chosen by individual countries, with the Maastricht criteria held over as conditions for accession later to the governing board of the European Central Bank. Pure political conditionality, relating to the quality of democratic governance, should be essentially reserved for the final decision on whether the country is to be admitted as a full member state. This is what is relevant for the functioning of the governing institutions of the EU. This political conditionality should not be used in graduations mixed up with the scheme of functional conditionalities proposed for the four blocks of policy, since it is this which causes confusions at present. In the event of egregious relapse into undemocratic or otherwise gravely objectionable political behaviour (abuse of human rights, the use of force towards minorities or other countries, etc.) the SAA process should be suspended.
Conclusions
The new context makes the time ripe for the EU and the states of the Western Balkans to look again at the current pre-accession strategy for the region based on the SAA process.
The SAA process itself is more symbolic than substantial, apart from commitments to implement free trade. It is otherwise very long on vague intentions to cooperate, which lack political or economic muscle.
The case is therefore made for significant moves towards functional integration of the whole of the region with the EU, which can amount to a considerable degree of 'functional membership' that could be achieved irrespective of how or when the EU overcomes its Lisbon Treaty hiatus.
The existing set of free trade commitments should be replaced by a collective move of all the Western Balkans into the customs union of the EU and Turkey, thus making an uninterrupted economic space across the EU and the whole of South East Europe. This is a far more advantageous proposition that the present intentions to supplement the existing free trade commitments with a complex rules of origin procedures (for diagonal cumulation), which would in any case be scrapped later upon accession.
Problems of smuggling products such as tobacco and petrol should be countered by the adoption of the EU's harmonised minimum excise duties throughout the region.
Eurozone doctrine should be adapted to realities. Rather than regarding the use of the euro by Montenegro and Kosovo as unfortunate moves, the costs and benefits of unilateral adoption of the euro by not-yet member states of the region should be more openly appraised. Unilateral euroisation should be recognised as a possible option, but not an obligation. The usual Maastricht criteria could, with minor technical adjustments, still be used after accession as pre-conditions for entering into the governance of the eurozone.
It is positive that the energy and transport sectors are the subject of actions (already taken or now proposed) to integrate the whole of the Western Balkans into these EU policies. This makes it all the more anomalous that the EU's trade and monetary policies towards the region lag behind, depriving the region's economies of synergetic benefits between the whole set of economic policies. This anomaly reflects a lack of coherence across the Commission's various departments.
It is also positive that the EU has moved at the declaratory level towards visa 'liberalisation', which means scrapping visas rather than the so-called 'facilitation' measures. However the Commission has not yet published any guidelines or timelines for this. Presumably there will be requirements for various security standards in passports, and cooperation with EU security services; but otherwise this decision of principle to scrap visas should be put onto a fast track, since it is central to the aspirations of the people of the region.
The region could be put on track for access to the Structural Funds on terms and scales progressively approaching those from which new member states such as Bulgaria and Romania already benefit; for the time being the ratio is 4:1 more favourable for the new member states. Drawing on the EU's recent experiences of gross corruption in the use of EU funds in these new member states there should be conditions for major increases in the volume of aid in the Western Balkans, including programmes to improve judiciaries and the implementation of anticorruption standards.
This overall recalibration of EU policies towards the Western Balkans would see an adjustment in the sequencing of conditionality and incentive structures. Today access to EU policies is largely conditioned on full accession and the associated political conditionality of the Copenhagen criteria, even if some exceptions are being introduced (e.g. for energy and transport). The foregoing proposals favour increased participation in EU policies before accession, with increased regional multilateralism in this process, and more clearly defined functional conditionality. This still leaves, however, the final test of conformity with all the Copenhagen criteria before accession. 
